CHAPTER FIVE

Transnational Knowledge, American Hegemony

Social Scientists in US-Occupied Japan

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After 1945 the United States solidified its status as a global hegemon in part through the "soft power" strategy of underwriting the intellectual reconstruction of its aligned nations. Recent scholarship has examined American support for the natural sciences and engineering in both devastated allies and erstwhile enemies. The result was a transnational network of knowledge production centered on the United States and supporting US geopolitical aspirations.[1] Less well studied but no less important is the contribution of social science. On the eve of the Cold War, American social scientists used research to advance "progress" according to the ideals of the then-popular ideology of modernization. Modernization presented the putatively American values of democracy, capitalism, and peace as a universal endpoint. Modernizers, in other words, believed that all societies were capable of progressing toward peaceful, liberal democratic capitalism. During the Cold War, they extended US assistance toward this end to recruit nations to the American fold in opposition to the competing allure of communism offered by the Soviet Union.

Japan, the site of America's longest peaceful postwar occupation (August 1945 to April 1952), was regarded as both a test case and a showcase of modernization theory.[2] As such, the nation poses a particularly fruitful lens for examining the geopolitical significance of social science

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in the sphere of US hegemony. Western-style social science reached Japan in the late nineteenth century and was grafted on to local intellectual traditions. By the early twentieth century, the nation had established itself within the burgeoning community of knowledge-producing states. However, the outbreak of World War II isolated Japanese scholars. The defeat of Japan in 1945 offered the United States an opportunity to reshape Japanese research practices according to American cultural values and to restructure the transnational intellectual network of the prewar years into a US-dominated entity that served national political ambitions in the Cold War era.

Understanding the importance of face-to-face interactions in accomplishing these goals, the American Occupation bureaucracy dispatched scores of scholars to Japan. Social scientists did not come, as they so often did among Native Americans and colonized peoples, to study "primitivity" or Otherness. Instead, as both Japanese and American scholars later claimed, their relationships often exemplified the teacher-student bond used as a largely positive metaphor for the Occupation itself. Through texts, lectures, and, most important, collaborative fieldwork, American social scientists modeled and promoted the ideals of modernization. Meanwhile, their Japanese counterparts capitalized on their unprecedented position and influence over the government and public to enshrine these values within an instrumental national identity as a US ally.

In contrast to Europe, to which the United States acknowledged a cultural similarity and historical debt that implicitly obligated the nation to restore local stability and prosperity, most early postwar Americans felt little sense of identification with Japan. On the contrary, World War II represented the culmination of decades of anti-Japanese sentiment. Virulent hate literature abounded, depicting the Japanese as a pathologically and incorrigibly inferior race. Racism was also at the heart of the US government policy of interning Japanese immigrants and their descendants, including many American citizens.[3] While the end of the war blunted the most visceral aversion, postwar American sentiments continued to reflect a sense of superiority and paternalism toward the former enemy, famously compared to a boy of twelve by Occupation chief General Douglas MacArthur.[4] These attitudes did not disappear in the years after 1945 and continue to mark the American stance toward Japan to some degree even to this day. The postwar embrace of mutual values could not override all existing prejudices. Nonetheless, in the estab-

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lishment of the new order, faith in modernization helped to supplant the absence of a shared past by enabling the imagination of a collective future. By building a common circuit of knowledge production cohered by shared values, American and Japanese scholars jointly reimagined the world under US hegemony.

New Knowledge, Old Producers

Although Japan had a long and distinguished scholastic tradition, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that Western-style social science and its accompanying institutions, including universities, museums, and research organizations, became entrenched in the national landscape. The earliest generation of Japanese social scientists largely mastered the disciplines through study abroad or from European or American tutors at home. As in much of the world, German social theories and methods were particularly influential. Within only a few decades, Japanese scholars had proven themselves capable not only of mastering but also of adding to social science. During the interwar years, the rate of Japanese participation in international conferences and publication in foreign languages soared.[5]

As the first non-Western power to gain recognition as a producer of legitimate, original knowledge, Japan gave the international intellectual community some status as a transnational rather than merely Euro-American entity. All too soon, however, the outbreak of war in the 1930s introduced new political, ideological, and even physical boundaries to the participation of Japanese scholars. Rather than continuing to cultivate intellectual linkages with the great powers, Japan came to focus on the development of academic networks in its burgeoning empire. In pursuit of professional status and resources, researchers sought evidence of the superiority of the Japanese people and their consequent right, even obligation, to impose the rule of the allegedly divine emperor over the inferior but confraternal peoples of Asia and Oceania. While surveying the bodies and behaviors of local peoples, fieldworkers provided information intended to facilitate the exploitation of human and natural resources, the pacification and administration of conquered territories, and the assimilation of populations within the Japanese Empire.[6] To maximize safety and efficiency in hostile and remote territories, they often ventured to the field in groups. Ranging from a handful to hundreds

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of participants, these team expeditions built a sense of professional solidarity among social scientists while spreading complicity with imperialism and war through the intellectual ranks.

Beginning in 1940, Japan's invasion of Southeast Asia set in motion a chain of events that ultimately prompted the United States to enter World War II. Against the Axis enemy, the Allies rallied under the banner of representative government, the free market, and peace. As the then-popular ideology of modernization taught, these values were the endpoint of development and universally accessible to all societies (with US tutelage). The looming victory of the Allies appeared to be "objective" confirmation of this belief.

Traditionally, the transnational community of social scientists upheld objectivity, thought of as universal "truth" free from proclivity or bias, as the defining value of legitimate scholarship. As historians have shown, however, in practice objectivity has often functioned as a rhetoric of legitimacy for various ideological positions.[7] Shocked and horrified by the devastation and atrocities of World War II, Allied social scientists asserted a paramount responsibility for creating knowledge that would not simply describe the human condition but also advance the modernization telos. "This is apparently the first time in world history when the people of many lands have officially turned to the social scientist to seek his aid in man's quest for enduring peace," enthused a multinational group of prominent scholars.[8] By the end of the war, the practice of objective research was identified with the pursuit of democracy, capitalism, and peace.

With the goal of understanding the enemy and preparing for peacetime reconstruction, American social scientists intensified their study of Japanese culture and society. The most influential research on this topic was renowned anthropologist Ruth Benedict's monograph *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946). Beginning her research on Japan in mid-1944 but writing largely after the war had ended, Benedict sought to set forth an understanding of Japan that would facilitate the transition to peace and promote a collaborative rather than punitive occupation. Benedict's work followed in the tradition of "national character" studies, which anthropomorphized and homogenized nations as individuals defined by personality traits rooted in cultural indoctrination, particularly during early childhood. Many of Benedict's colleagues viewed the Japanese national character as pathologically deviant, defined by aggressiveness, group-mindedness, authoritarianism, rigidity, and fear of dis-

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honor. They viewed these predispositions as an explanation for the protracted, doomed struggle and atrocities of World War II.[9] Benedict, by contrast, rejected the idea of an incorrigible, abnormal national character. Instead, she attributed the nation's wartime course to a small militarist coterie that had taken the Japanese down a "wrong path." Removing power from authoritarian leaders, she implied, would free mass society to transition to US-style democracy. *Chrysanthemum*, American anthropologist Clifford Geertz later remarked, represented the Japanese as "the most reasonable enemy we have ever conquered."[10]

Studied by nearly all Occupation personnel in preparation for service overseas, *Chrysanthemum* lent the credibility of professional social science to an instrumental conclusion: that Japan might be quickly and effectively reconstituted as an American ally in East Asia and the Pacific Rim. US policy-makers were eager to use Japan (like West Germany) to counter the growing threat of Soviet power. The prewar emperor system had to be discarded as quickly as possible to clear the way for a new ideological orientation toward democracy, capitalism, and peace. Rather than painstakingly sifting through the general population for proponents of militarism, fascism, and imperialism, Benedict suggested that the United States might simply charge responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity "to specific individuals and institutions . . . identified and isolated from the mainstream."[11] Ultimately, tribunals of the late 1940s purged some two hundred thousand individuals, representing a mere 0.29 percent of the total population. (By contrast, some 2.5 percent of Germans under American occupation were legally excluded from public life.)[12] Victims in Japanese academia numbered fewer than one hundred, or about 0.3 percent of active professors.[13] Evidence suggests that the Occupation was more concerned with rooting out suspected communists than with prosecuting former advocates of empire and war.[14]

The American academic establishment endorsed this whitewashing of the past activities of Japan's intellectuals, faulting the irresistible domination of the military and bureaucracy for "imposing destabilizing restraints" that reduced the social scientist "to the level of a special pleader and propagandist."[15] Given their own contributions to the war effort—for example, by one estimate up to three-quarters of professional anthropologists in the United States worked at least part-time on applied research in the early 1940s—American scholars were inclined to understand their Japanese counterparts as "no more than normally

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patriotic for a period of nationalism."[16] Moreover, the consequences of social science research in the Japanese Empire were borne mostly by colonial subjects—a population that the United States and its allies largely overlooked in the postwar pursuit of justice.[17]

Japanese scholars embraced this justification of their wartime record. Exoneration incentivized them to prove the Occupation narrative of wartime oppression true by showing themselves as enthusiastic proponents of democracy, capitalism, and peace. With the defeat and consequent discrediting of the Japanese state and military as arbiters of national identity, they asserted unprecedented influence over public life. Nanbara Shigeru, president of the University of Tokyo (Japan's leading institution of higher learning), set the tone for this stance in a November 1945 speech declaring scholars' "especial obligation for rebuilding the nation . . . on a new foundation of truth and freedom."[18] Nanbara's successor, the distinguished economist Yanaihara Tadao, likewise emphasized social scientists' responsibility to cultivate the vaunted values of the United States: "If we are hereafter to make our knowledge really an active force, it is of primary importance that . . . knowledge be spread widely and freely among the people and thus intensive interest in peace be aroused in every aspect of their lives. In practice, we scientists can achieve something only when we place our trust in the people and walk in step with them."[19] In this way, Japanese social scientists sought to rebuild academia, fashion a positive national identity, and join the intellectual community associated with the geopolitical hegemony of the United States.[20]

Establishing the Pillars of Postwar Research in Japan

To American observers of the Occupation era, Japanese social scientists appeared "an extremely interesting group," "all very bright and effective people." The war, however, had cut them off from the transnational intellectual community, resulting in a "period of isolation which for Japanese scholars and scientists was as strict as that which had preceded the opening of Japan in the last century [following over 250 years of self-imposed withdrawal from contact with most foreign societies]."[21] Moreover, one American scholar observed, "What has been decidedly unfortunate is an overlong persistence of the influence of German social science."[22] Although American scholars themselves owed an incal-

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culable debt to Germanic theories and methods, Germany's status as a defeated nation and the horrific misuse of science by the Nazis decisively disgraced its intellectual legacy. In consultation with over eighty Japanese academics, Harvard University anthropology professor Clyde Kluckhohn (who had studied in Austria during the 1930s) charged that Germanic logic, philosophy, and ideas of law and the state had molded prewar Japanese research into "a means of promoting autocracy within and aggression without," "not something based on free inquiry resulting in universal good."[23]

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP (an acronym typically used for the entire Occupation bureaucracy), sought to replace the "un-democratic" and "fascist" mentalities attributed to the former Axis powers with American ideals of democracy, capitalism, and peace. These values were the basis of a reconstituted transnational network of knowledge production. In contrast to the prewar intellectual community, which was dominated by Europeans, this network was to center on the United States and support the maintenance and extension of American hegemony against the much vaunted threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies.[24]

The Constitution of Japan, drafted in 1946 and imposed in 1947 by SCAP, laid the foundations of Japanese participation in this network by guaranteeing academic freedom as well as freedom of thought and conscience.[25] The Fulbright Scholars and Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas programs sent a handful of Japanese social scientists abroad to train in US institutions. However, given limited funding and restrictions on travel for Japanese citizens during the Occupation, most training took place locally under the supervision of the Civil Information and Education Unit (CIE), established by SCAP in September 1945. CIE staff included numerous proficient speakers of Japanese who had lived in the country (often in missionary families) or received training at military language schools during World War II. Recruits ranged from renowned scholars at elite institutions to untested ABDs (all-but-dissertation graduate students) in search of professional opportunity and adventure.[26] David L. Sills, a sociology student at Yale University who joined the CIE in August 1947, described himself bluntly as "a pure mercenary," recalling, "I came to the occupation of Japan to make money so I could pursue my graduate work."[27]

As a starting point for their attempt to restructure knowledge production, CIE staff sought to build a library network through which Japanese

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colleagues might enjoy access to foreign scholarship. From the perspective of American policy-makers, the library was "a potent engine of democracy . . . mak[ing] available to all what would otherwise be reserved to the few." Although Japan had maintained a modern library system since the late nineteenth century, the war had interrupted foreign acquisitions and domestic publishing. By one estimate, firebombing claimed half of Japan's book resources in the early 1940s, leaving no more than five million volumes in the entire nation at the time of defeat.[28] The scarcity of recent literature was particularly acute. A concerned American scholar wrote, "I gather . . . that [Japanese social scientists] subscribe to few, if any, journals and that the students and faculty do not therefore have access to the many crucially important articles and monographs that have been published in the past."[29] Shortage was opportunity: "The field is open to the far-sighted nation that restocks the sources of supply for Japan's book-reading public," predicted one anthropologist.[30] Wrote another, "the U.S. task is to insure that an adequate quantity and a wide variety of information on democracy are made available to Japan's information-starved intelligentsia and highly literate masses. Only such information can provide the background needed for forming attitudes favorable to a democratic order."[31] Implicit in this exhortation was the fear that the Soviet Union might flood Japan with propaganda and win the hearts and minds of the people to communism.

Responding to geopolitical pressures, one CIE employee entreated a prospective colleague to "bring everything you can get your hands on which deals with public opinion, social psychology, social research, methods, etc. Write for permission pronto to get 300 pounds extra hold baggage, for books and papers. . . . We are especially desirous of monographs on actual research projects, as well as text and instructional material."[32] He and others petitioned their home institutions for surplus copies of important recent monographs and journals.[33] Additional donations poured in from charitable and scholarly foundations and societies, government agencies, publishers, and concerned citizens. By the midpoint of the Occupation, nearly 1.25 million English-language books had reached Japan.[34]

Distribution bottlenecks trapped some donations in warehouses for up to a year while the CIE worked to create a network of libraries throughout the Japanese archipelago. The flagship facility in downtown Tokyo housed some thirteen thousand books and five hundred periodicals. In the reading room, postwar leaders of Japanese social science

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studied the works of Benedict and others for the first time. Ultimately, twenty-three CIE libraries came to offer access to not just texts but also lectures, concerts, discussion groups, English language classes, documentary film screenings, and exhibits to as many as two million patrons annually.[35] SCAP also introduced legislation to create a public library network by expanding and rebuilding existing facilities and resources, implementing modern cataloging methods, and abolishing fees for patrons. By the end of the 1950s nearly every prefecture and over half of Japan's cities, as well as some towns and villages, operated public libraries.[36]

Beyond bringing English-language books to Japan, the CIE also supported Japanese translations of selected social science works, including Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. Much to the disgust of American officials who saw no value in popular fare, translators also rendered manuals on baseball and housekeeping, Margaret Mitchell's 1936 bestseller *Gone with the Wind*, and children's literature. The program expanded quickly as SCAP rushed to counteract the perceived threat of communism embodied by a spate of Japanese-language editions of Soviet Russian works. By the midpoint of the Occupation, the CIE had sponsored some 150 translations and licensed 200 others.[37] By making available the classics of US civilization for Japanese consumption, SCAP sought to instill putatively American mentalities of democracy, capitalism, and international cooperation.

Public lectures offered an alternative mode of transmitting these values. Speakers not only conveyed information but also built personal relationships with audience members. Reflected one CIE anthropologist, "I do my best job around here in communicating new ideas to our Japanese, in showing our younger people how to organize a project, in introducing American methods and knowledge to them. . . . I teach all the time. I'd rather do it than anything else."[38] A thank-you note from a Japanese sociologist read: "We have learned so much from your lectures delivered from quite a different angle than ours. . . . In the near future, I hope, we will show you better sociology and contribute more to the social science of the world."[39] Through face-to-face interactions, American scholars recruited Japanese colleagues as partners in the establishment of a transnational knowledge network that supported the hegemony of the United States.

In 1950 a more systematic training program was inaugurated in the form of the American Studies Seminar (Amerika kenkyū seminā), jointly

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hosted by the University of Tokyo and Stanford University and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. In the early postwar era, private foundations such as Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie provided critical support for the development of a global intellectual network friendly to US geopolitical ambitions.[40] Modeled on a similar endeavor in Salzburg, Austria, the American Studies Seminar aspired to "imbu[e] the defeated nation of Japan with the spirit of American democracy and . . . promot[e] intellectual, scholarly exchange between the United States and Japan."[41] As one proponent exhorted, "Democratic institutions exemplified in American life should become better known in Japan, and training in the history of American traditions should become part of the normal university curriculum in the new age. Successive generations of Japanese students should be encouraged to study American affairs so that they may carry to their leadership in public life a better comprehension of our country."[42] By teaching an interdisciplinary social science program according to American methods, the seminar sought to diffuse US values among Japanese intellectuals.

Over the course of five weeks in the summer of 1950, five well-known American senior professors, each representing a different discipline, lectured and held small roundtables for two hours each weekday afternoon for a total of nearly 125 Japanese participants ranging in age from twenty-three to fifty-four.[43] Owing to the varied levels of English-language proficiency among participants, seminar leaders relied on name cards, predistributed outlines, and nearly two dozen interpreters to facilitate communication. These teaching aids helped to achieve the facilitators' goal of free and uninhibited intellectual exchange, viewed as the essence of American-style democracy. As one applauded, "The give and take of the seminar method was established during the first week. The quality of the discussion was high, and absolute frankness between Japanese and Americans was achieved. The reputation of the seminars was well established among academic circles in Tokyo before the end of the first week."[44]

Adjudged "an outstanding success despite the unrelenting heat and the long sessions," the program was repeated annually through 1956, four years after the termination of the Occupation.[45] The seminar ultimately reached nearly six hundred professors and students (both graduate and undergraduate). Moreover, beginning in 1952 the University of Kyoto and Dōshisha University (a historically Christian college) inaugurated a parallel Kyoto American Studies Seminar that ran every summer

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(with the exception of 1953) through 1976. Heavy and rising competition for access ensured highly qualified and motivated classes. Participants were selected from throughout the archipelago in the hope that they would bring knowledge back to their home prefectures. Beyond the classroom, students and professors met during office hours, field trips, cultural events, and publicity opportunities with the national media.[46] The seminar created a library of assigned readings; by 1953 it included over one thousand books.[47] It also spawned a fellowship program that brought two Japanese scholars to the United States annually for a year of study and a public lecture series on topics such as "Japanese acceptance of and resistance to American democracy" and "appraisals of American influence on thought, religion, art, and way of life upon the Japanese."[48]

Given the "depressingly small" compensation and relative lack of amenities (one professor was advised to bring his own refrigerator), most visiting Americans were motivated by volunteer spirit.[49] One reflected, "My stay in Japan has been one of the happiest periods in my life. I know that I have *received* in abundance; if I have *given* something in return, if I have made some slight contribution to the thinking and teaching of my Japanese colleagues, I shall be satisfied" (emphasis in original).[50] Others lauded the surprising intellectual benefits they themselves derived from the program: "We are convinced that it is valuable for American scholars to confront the Japanese interpretations of American traditions and culture. Although we frequently found ourselves in disagreement with these interpretations, we ourselves derived many penetrating insights from the Japanese perspective. . . . These served as a constant stimulus for the discussion and reconsideration of our assumptions."[51] This generally humble attitude of American facilitators made a favorable impression on Japanese participants. Inaugurating the fourth seminar in 1953, Yanaihara Tadao captured the collaborative mood: "The American professors are our guests and at the same time they are our colleagues. They did not come here to make American propaganda nor did they come to diagnose Japanese feeling toward Americans. We stand on the equal ground of academic learning and are colleagues striving toward the common goal in search of scientific truth."[52] Japanese participants expressed their appreciation in similar terms. One wrote to his facilitator in gratitude, "I thank you heartily for your coming again to Japan to enlighten us young (spiritually) lovers of wisdom. Your zeal for education touches me deeply."[53] Through the reconstruction of social science, American scholars recruited their Japanese counterparts not as subordinates but

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as colleagues and partners in the entrenchment of shared values and the establishment of a transnational knowledge network that supported the hegemony of the United States.

Realizing American Ideals through Fieldwork in Japan

To a greater degree than training in the library and classroom, fieldwork came to symbolize and advance Japan's transformation into a peaceful, capitalist, democratic society. Through the collection of empirical data, Japanese and American social scientists sought "objectively ascertained facts" as the basis for democratic and inclusive policy-making. Meanwhile, relations among researchers modeled the collaborative, egalitarian spirit they hoped to cultivate in society at large.

By the time of the Occupation, Japanese social scientists had a long tradition of field research both at home and in the empire.[54] From the outset of the Occupation, interest in continuing and improving upon field practice was apparent to SCAP. In 1947 one survey reported that Japanese scholars throughout the archipelago were "exceedingly eager for field work" and that "many college administrators pay at least lip service to the idea of empirical social research."[55] One revealing indication was the proliferation of translations of works by Bronisław Malinowski (1884–1942), the Polish-born British social anthropologist often represented as the architect of methodological guidelines for "objective" fieldwork. Texts translated during the early postwar years included Malinowski's *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (orig. 1926), *The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia* (orig. 1929), and *A Scientific Theory of Culture* (orig. 1944).[56]

Prior to the Occupation the sole English-language academic field study of Japan was *Suye Mura*, a 1936 village ethnography by University of Chicago sociologist John F. Embree. "Every anthropologist who went to Japan in the 1950s knew Embree's book well," recalled one CIE employee.[57] Writing a decade after Embree, Ruth Benedict incorporated some of his conclusions into *Chrysanthemum* but was prevented by the war from visiting Japan personally.[58] Instead, she worked according to a method known as "research at a distance." With the help of a second-generation Japanese American informant, Benedict interviewed and conducted psychological tests on interned Japanese emigrants and their descendants and analyzed Japanese texts, images, and films. To many

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American anthropologists who read *Chrysanthemum* in preparation for service in occupied Japan, fieldwork represented an opportunity to confirm her findings in the field.

SCAP's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division (PO&SR) coordinated the first field studies of the Occupation era. The PO&SR was created in early 1946 as a subcommittee of the CIE to train Japanese social scientists in American theories and methods and to supply research on the national mood. To SCAP policy-makers, "The democratic atmosphere created by the Occupation has resulted in a widespread feeling among both government officials and the people at large that knowledge of public opinion is important for democratic government."[59] Public opinion research, therefore, emerged as both an agent and a result of popular participation in politics.

Herbert Passin (1916–2003), an ABD in sociology from the University of Chicago, served as the deputy director of the PO&SR. Passin was an experienced survey researcher who developed an interest in Japan through his work with former inmates of internment camps for Japanese and Japanese Americans. He was fluent in written and spoken Japanese, having studied at the Army Language School at the University of Michigan during the early 1940s. Following the departure of the PO&SR's original director, Passin recruited his former classmate John W. Bennett (1915–2005), an assistant professor of anthropology at Ohio State University, for the position. The PO&SR also hired a handful of other American researchers, including Japanese American veterans of studies of wartime internment camps in the US West.[60] They were outnumbered by more than a dozen Japanese social scientists (as well as over thirty temporary and secretarial employees).

On financial grounds alone, employment at the PO&SR was highly desirable. In the desperate years of the late 1940s, academic positions in Japanese universities provided little economic stability. Advisers to SCAP described the "terrible fight" professors faced to "keep themselves alive":[61] "Totally inadequate university salaries do not give the individual scholars even a minimum living wage, with the result that time which would otherwise be devoted to research is instead devoted to supplementing the family income through repeating lectures in other universities and schools, through hack writing, and through other activities even further removed from research and the scholarly life."[62] By providing work, Bennett concluded, "the Division saved the professional lives of a number of Japanese sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists."[63]

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The relative seniority and reputation of many Japanese employees, compared with the youth and inexperience of Bennett, Passin, and their American coworkers, helped to forestall anticipated hierarchies of victor and vanquished. Bennett described his Japanese colleagues as "the top ranking social scientists of the country, fully comparable in skill and intelligence to the best in the States—better in fact." He wrote to his wife, "It is a strange feeling . . . to have around one's desk the minister of communications in the Jap[anese] gov[ernment], the chairman of the sociology dept. at the largest university, and the top social psychologist in Japan, all bowing and honoring me!"[64] Bennett's respect for the knowledge and experience of Japanese scholars, coupled with reciprocal Japanese interest in US methodologies and humility toward the victorious Allies, generally facilitated productive working relationships.

Among the PO&SR's earliest and most influential studies was an assessment of the impact of land reform, carried out in 1947–1948. One year earlier, the Occupation had mandated the breakup and redistribution of large estates, seeking to "replace traditional agrarian feudalism with a democratic way of life" by creating a nation of independent yeoman farmers.[65] To evaluate the resulting social and economic changes in villages, SCAP called upon Arthur F. Raper, a renowned sociologist at the US Department of Agriculture. Working with the PO&SR, Raper selected thirteen allegedly representative, geographically dispersed communities for study. When published, Raper's report was hailed as a follow-up to Embree's classic study and applauded as "a completely unbiased, uninfluenced account" of Japanese village life.[66]

Raper worked with four American and fifteen Japanese social scientists at the PO&SR over the course of three stints of fieldwork totaling nearly seven months between 1947 and 1949. His group expedition methodology set the tone for early postwar research. For Japanese scholars, teamwork was a familiar practice from the age of empire, when the dangers and expense of in situ investigation necessitated collaboration. Although independent fieldwork was the rule in American academia, US social scientists, too, had come to view cooperation favorably. No less a spokesperson than Margaret Mead extolled the personal and practical benefits of intellectual complementarity.[67] In addition to these advantages, Raper's decision to work with a team reflected conditions particular to occupied Japan. Whereas American scholars initially expected to train Japanese colleagues, the latter soon emerged as a critical source of expertise. Passin, a key contributor to the study, recalled, "When I

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started on this research, I drew upon my recent sociological research in southern Illinois during my graduate student days, my knowledge of black sharecroppers in the American South, my experience with Mexican peasants, and my general reading in the fields of anthropology and rural sociology. . . . But I did not even have a vocabulary to describe the new phenomena that came to my attention."[68]

Beyond language and cultural barriers, American researchers also confronted the distrust of their informants. Many rural communities, associating public opinion research with the wartime military police, mistrusted the foreigners in their midst. To alleviate suspicion, Japanese social scientists took the lead in the field, arranging for village officials to distribute questionnaires and conducting intensive interviews with local informants. Ultimately, they gathered up to 95 percent of the PO&SR data.[69]

In addition to serving as the locus of knowledge production, the field was also a space for direct tutelage in democracy, including the sharing of opinions, the expression of dissent, and the cultivation of consensus. Passin described his typical on-site routine: "At the end of each day of interviewing . . . we then sat around in a group and discussed the interviewing problems, the meaning of the results, and compared local results with those obtained in the Tokyo phase of the study. Suggestions for the recording of further verbatim materials, election and political records were outlined."[70] A Japanese social scientist later recalled the excitement of debating survey techniques for up to two nights straight.[71]

Collaboration in the field drew Japanese and American social scientists together in lasting personal bonds. Raper recalled his team positively, though not without reference to certain stereotypes of national character: "I was tremendously impressed with the capability of the people. They were very thoroughly regimented. I came back very convinced that if our civilization turned on learning calculus and theirs turned on learning calculus, they would survive and we wouldn't—because if they needed to learn calculus, they'd all learn calculus in one year, because they have it fixed up so they could operate in that kind of fashion."[72] Meanwhile, Japanese social scientists appreciated the hands-on training they received under Raper, though they chafed against the demand for speed. The second stint in the field was particularly rushed. Traveling by train and jeep, testing the goodwill of local officials, and working "almost without rest," researchers visited five villages in a mere forty-five days, returned to Tokyo for twenty-four hours, and then departed for

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the next six sites. Factoring in travel time, they spent one or at most two nights in each location. Concerning the challenge "to do a month's research in a day," one recalled, "there was a lot of complaining."[73]

Following the conclusion of the land reform study, the PO&SR undertook field and public opinion research on such topics as traditional fishery rights, neighborhood associations, family and household composition, the labor boss system (*oyabun-kobun*), problems of urban workers and consumers, the changing status of women, the reform of the zaibatsu, and literacy and language education.[74] Highlighting the advance of democracy, capitalism, and cooperation, such research established a convergence of values between postwar Japan and the United States.

Legacies

Their ambitions notwithstanding, Bennett and his coworkers ultimately failed to exert much impact on SCAP policy. In part, the understaffing of the PO&SR was to blame: one employee observed that twenty to thirty social scientists would have been needed to adequately discharge the workload assigned to two or three.[75] More cripplingly, SCAP paid no more than lip service to the importance of research, except through what the PO&SR regarded as obstructionist or interfering management. The application of research findings to decision-making was further hamstrung by the generally ill-defined aims that characterized the Occupation itself. In the words of a disgruntled Bennett, "Nobody has any idea of what policy really means in an Occupation, nor have they any concrete program. Just pass along from one small problem to another, solving each one as they go, with a total lack of vision or purpose other than the vague one of doing everything the American way."[76]

Yet the reformulation of Japanese academia under the Occupation left an enduring impact on postwar social science in the United States, Japan, and beyond. As a result of their experiences in the field and work with Japanese colleagues, American scholars in Japan came to question earlier assumptions about the Japanese national character. Instead of the homogeneity that Benedict had led them to expect, they confronted "a strong local divergence in type." Noting that "every group I meet seems different; every individual I meet is an individual," Bennett concluded that the assumption of homogeneity "is dangerous to use in the sense of conferring an ability upon the investigator to make generalizations

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about Japanese culture of an order comparable to those made for primitive societies."[77] *Chrysanthemum* was quietly removed from the PO&SR library, and many Occupation scholars came to dismiss the study of national character as "a highly elaborate structure built on flimsy and suspect evidence."[78]

The PO&SR was dissolved in June 1951 in anticipation of the termination of the Occupation. Only three months later Japan and the United States signed the San Francisco Treaty, marking the end of World War II, and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Sōgō kyoryoku oyobi anzen hoshō jōyaku, often referred to as Anpo), which set forth the terms of the post-Occupation relationship between the two nations. The agreement sheltered Japan, which was constitutionally banned from maintaining armed forces and waging war, beneath the American military and nuclear umbrella. It also itemized the ways in which Japan was called upon to support the hegemon's geopolitical agenda in Asia, including the maintenance of permanent bases for US air, land, and sea forces. As the treaties stipulated, Japan regained independent sovereignty in April 1952.

Repatriated American social scientists capitalized on their experiences under the Occupation to spearhead the study of Japan in the United States. The previously marginal field of Japanese studies blossomed in the years after 1952. It served as a cornerstone of Cold War area studies, the primary intellectual approach to developing nations during the 1950s and 1960s. Area studies, a multidisciplinary endeavor, sought to advance both theoretical and empirical knowledge of states and regions through intensive language preparation, on-the-ground research, and the incorporation of local viewpoints and interpretations. Critics today often understand area studies as an attempt to perpetuate the power structures of imperialism in the Cold War, replacing overt political control with indirect attempts to foster putatively American values in unaligned developing nations. Research established a hierarchy of "students" generously supported by their home governments and "subjects" dominated by knowledge thus produced. The trajectory of Japanese studies, however, did not conform to this pattern. By the 1960s Japan had transitioned from a developing nation to one of the world's largest economies. Social scientists accordingly took up the task of extrapolating structural, cultural, and psychological lessons for other nations under the sway of US geopolitical dominance.[79]

The Occupation also transformed Japanese academia. In February

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1952, mere weeks before the departure of SCAP, twenty leaders of Japanese social science united for a long-planned roundtable on the state of research in the postwar nation. Participants reflected on the Occupation as "a bridge toward the reconstruction of Japanese scholarship" and the starting point of genuinely objective intellectual inquiry.[80] The shared conviction that the values of democracy, capitalism, and peace undergirded knowledge production facilitated cooperation between the United States and Japan and mutual satisfaction in both study and reform.

The intellectual partnership arising from common ideals was perhaps the most enduring legacy of SCAP's overhaul of Japanese knowledge production. The struggle to secure a job in postwar Japanese academia was intensely competitive, pitting venerable graybeards against new graduates and Japan-based faculty against repatriating scholars from universities in the former empire. In the post-Occupation years, connections with US social scientists came to function as a critical credential and source of contacts for obtaining a faculty position. Put simply, virtually all Japanese employed in academia in the 1950s had some experience working under SCAP, and hence exposure to American culture, friendship, and values. The CIE and PO&SR took a particular interest in the post-Occupation fate of their Japanese affiliates, helping many to secure university jobs. In cases where such employment was not available, SCAP helped locate positions in libraries, museums, newspaper and journal editorial boards, and independent research organizations. A few scholars even received fellowships to study in the United States.[81]

Long after the Occupation, Japanese scholars continued to undertake research that buttressed the geopolitical hegemony of the United States by indexing and furthering modernization in their nation and beyond. To be sure, receptivity to American values did not preclude the possibility of dissent with the United States. With the reappearance of far-Right nationalism in the 1950s, some social scientists promoted the rearming of Japan and the "restoration" of direct rule by the emperor. More common were leftist denunciations of Japan's complicity with the American geopolitical agenda, animating discourse in every branch of social science. Tsurumi Shunsuke (1922–2015), a historian and philosopher, gave voice to popular pacifism in his journal *Shisō no kagaku* (The science of thought). In art theory and practice, Okamoto Tarō (1911–1996) decried the hegemony of Western aesthetics, calling for Japan to break free of Euro-American domination by seeking inspiration from its "primi-

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tive" past and by cooperating with artists in the nonaligned Third World. Maruyama Masao (1917–1996), a political scientist today remembered as Japan's most prominent spokesman for early postwar liberalism, produced a stream of books and articles on prewar fascism and the need for an active citizenry capable of withstanding foreign pressures on its democracy.[82]

The increasingly critical stance of Japanese intellectuals did not pass unremarked by their American counterparts. Former Occupation attaché Edward Seidensticker (1921–2007), who studied at the University of Tokyo in the late 1950s, recalled,

> I was surrounded by very, very, intelligent boys, it was clear. That was simply beyond denying. . . . But they were unfriendly and they were opinionated, exceedingly opinionated, exceedingly doctrinaire . . . their view of the world which held America responsible for all of the mischief, all of the ails and all of the sufferings of the world, it just wasn't acceptable. . . . Their view of the world made me mad, but I think I also felt rather contemptuous of them. It seemed to me that they were misusing their undeniable talents. . . . I mean, this wasn't a view of the world which was worthy of a first-rate mind.[83]

Today, Seidensticker is widely considered to be one of the finest twentieth-century historians and translators of Japanese literature and a writer of extraordinary sensitivity and grace. In 1975 he received the Order of the Rising Sun, the highest medal awarded to cultural contributors by the Japanese government. Such words from a figure of this repute indicate the pervasiveness and durability of American paternalism and even racism toward Japan. However much the United States might rely on Japan as an ally, it remained locked in the hierarchical mentality of the immediate postwar period. The student could not challenge or supersede the teacher.

In 1960 prominent Japanese intellectuals did dispute Japan's ongoing relationship with the US military by leading mass protests against the renewal of the Anpo Treaty. In their enthusiasm for democracy, capitalism, and peace, Japanese intellectuals strongly objected to armed American engagement in Asia, including the maintenance of bases on national soil, the ongoing occupation of Japan's southernmost prefecture, Okinawa, and, by the end of the decade, the Vietnam War. The ratification of the treaty, forced by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke over the strenuous objections of the Japanese Diet, further provoked oppo-

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sition to a political system that allowed a strongman to prevail over the will of elected representatives. At this moment, in the eyes of many Japanese social scientists, their nation's relationship with the United States appeared not to exemplify but rather to betray the values they had embraced under American tutelage.

Mobilizing millions of citizens representing a broad cross section of society, the protests, the largest in Japan's history, indicated the entrenchment and maturation of putatively American values in the Japanese national consciousness. And yet, perhaps for this very reason, opposition to Anpo petered out without producing substantive change. Fifteen years after a brutal war, the nation had too much at stake—politically, economically, and intellectually—to seriously contest its relationship with the United States.[84] Spearheaded by social scientists, the common ideals of democracy, capitalism, and peace had knit together a resilient network of knowledge production undergirding American hegemony.

Notes

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3. John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).

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5. Miriam Kingsberg, "Legitimating Empire, Legitimating Nation: The Scientific Study of Opium Addiction in Japanese Manchuria," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012): 325–351.

6. Kawamura Minato, *"Dai Tōa minzoku" no kyojitsu* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1996); Nakao Katsumi, ed., *Shokuminchi jinruigaku no tenbō* (Tokyo: Fūkyōsha, 2000); Sakano Tōru, *Teikoku Nihon to jinruigakusha: 1884–1952-nen* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2008).

7. On objectivity in the social sciences, see, e.g., Peter Novick, *That Noble*

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9. E.g., Geoffrey Gorer, *Japanese Character Structure* (New York: Institute for Intercultural Studies, 1942); Douglas Haring, *Blood on the Rising Sun* (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1943); Arnold Meadow, *An Analysis of the Japanese Character Structure Based on Japanese Film Plots and Thematic Apperception Tests on Japanese Americans* (New York: Institute for Intercultural Studies, 1944).

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12. John D. Montgomery, *Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 26.

13. Sebastian Conrad, *The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century*, trans. Alan Nothnagle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 82.

14. In one ironic case, a prominent Japanese social scientist was cleared of communist leanings owing to his wartime collaboration with Austro-German colleagues. See "Application for Employment: Ishida Eiichirō," Record Group 331, Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, box 5870, file "Ishida Eiichirō," National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

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20. Ishida Takeshi, *Nihon no shakai kagaku* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984), 223; Laura Hein, *Reasonable Men, Powerful Words: Political Culture and Expertise in Twentieth Century Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 2–3; Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

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30. Douglas G. Haring, "The Challenge of Japanese Ideology," in Friedrich, *Japan's Prospect*, 259–286, at 280.

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33. Ishida Mikinosuke, "Tōhō minzokugaku kankei Ōbun kincho (ichi)," *Minzokugaku kenkyū* 13, no. 1 (1948): 80–85.

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